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Frequently an issue of this sort will come before the Court
clad, so to speak, in sheep's clothing: the potential of the
asserted principle to effect important change in the
equilibrium ofpower is not immediately evident, and must be
discerned by a careful and perceptive analysis. But this wolf
comes as a wolf.
-Antonin Scalia1

*
As this article was in the final stage of pre-publication review, Russia launched a
war of aggression against Ukraine. This clear violation of public international law, serious
breach of Article 3 of the Statute of Europe, and the horror it unleashed on millions of
Ukrainians, led the Committee of Ministers to decide "in the context of the procedure
launched under Article 8 of the Statute of the Council of Europe, that the Russian Federation
ceases to be a member of the Council of Europe as from 16 March 2022." See Resolution
CM/Res (2022)2 on the cessation of the membership of the Russian Federation to the Council
of Europe (Mar. 16, 2022). That same day, the European Court of Human Rights decided to
suspend the examination of all Russian cases pending before the Court. See Communiqu6 de
presse, La Cour europdenne des droits de l'Homme decide de suspendre l'examen de toutes les
requites contre la Fedrationde Russie, CEDH 092 (2022) 16.03.2022. As a matter of law,
Russia's departure should not prevent eventual adjudication of these cases (numbering over
17,000, see EUR. CT. OF HUM. RTs., ANNUAL REPORT 2021 180 (2022)), although meaningful
prospects for enforcement of such judgments in Russia now appear very dim. Nevertheless, it
is the opinion of the author and the editorial board that the argument and legal history
presented in this article, and the particular experience of Russia presented in Part V, remains
an important contribution about the mechanisms of an international human rights
organization that is more important than ever.
** University Distinguished Professor of Law, SMU Dedman School of Law. For their
comments and criticisms, I thank the conveners and participants at the XIII Annual
Development of Russian Law Conference, University of Helsinki, and at the Concepts and
Methods Workshop: When International Courts and Tribunals Defer to States, organized by
PluriCourts at the University of Oslo (both via Zoom). All errors are my own.
1.
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 699 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Cf. Matthew,
7:15 (NIV) ("They come to you in sheep's clothing, but inwardly they are ferocious wolves.").
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The restrictionspermitted under this Convention to the said
rights andfreedoms shall not be appliedfor any purpose other
than those for which they have been prescribed.
-Article 182
I. INTRODUCTION

This article makes two principal arguments. First, the limitation
on restricting rights that is established by Article 18 of the
European Convention on Human Rights is the mirror image of the
margin of appreciation doctrine created by the European Court of
Human Rights. As such, exploring the metes and bounds of Article
18 aids our understanding of that judicially created doctrine. Parts
II and III explore this connection and the origins of this limitation
on Member States.
The second argument is a practical application of the first one.
Russian accession to the Convention and membership in the Council
of Europe provides a case study on the importance of Article 18 and
the need to overcome a natural reluctance to find that a state has
violated it. The deference accorded by the margin of appreciation is
the by-product of an assumption of good faith accorded to Member
States. When that assumption no longer holds, the Strasbourg
Court may be presented not with a case of deserved deference, but
of defiance. Article 18 provides the Court with the tool that the
drafters of the Convention thought essential to preserve this
extraordinary system for protecting human rights.

Some of the Court's critics complain about miserly applications
of the margin of appreciation. They assert that a failure to give
Member States the respect they are due as sovereigns undermines
the Convention. But reluctance to call out restrictions on rights
made in bad faith is just as dangerous to the system as
underappreciation of legitimate differences in the good faith
application of Convention requirements. A failure to sanction
Member States that restrict rights in bad faith threatens the
Convention not by a deficit of respect but by an unwarranted surfeit
of it.
II. THE PRESUMPTION OF GOOD FAITH AND THE
MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE

The European Court of Human Rights grants Member States

some discretion in the implementation of the European Convention
2.
Article 18, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ.T.S. No. 5; 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
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on Human Rights. The Court's "margin of appreciation" doctrine is
often cited as a leading example of this deference. Along with the
principle of subsidiarity, it was explicitly added to the preamble of
the European Convention upon the entry into force of Protocol 15 on
August 1, 2021.3
That judicially created doctrine applies a bedrock assumption on
which the Convention is built: States are presumed to act in good
faith. As the Court itself has noted when examining a complaint
alleging violation of Article 18, "the whole structure of the
Convention rests on the general assumption that public authorities
in the member States act in good faith." 4 That assumption is also a
foundation of public international law. As the International Court
of Justice observed:
One of the basic principles governing the creation and
performance of legal obligations, whatever their source, is
the principle of good faith. Trust and confidence are inherent
in international co-operation, in particular in an age when
this co-operation in many fields is becoming increasingly
essential. Just as the very rule of pacta sunt servandain the
law of treaties is based on good faith, so also is the binding
character of an international obligation assumed by
unilateral declaration. 5
Members of the United Nations are required to "fulfill in good
faith the obligations assumed by them" in the organization's
charter. 6 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties begins by
noting that the principle of good faith is "universally recognized" in
international law.7 Article 26 states categorically: "Every treaty in
force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by
them in good faith." 8 What is more, the general rule of
interpretation starts with the premise that treaties shall be
interpreted in good faith. 9

The alternative, a presumption that states act in bad faith,
would be quicksand for international agreements and organizations.
Signature and ratification of agreements would be meaningless
exercises. A world in which the starting assumption is distrust of
3.
Protocol No. 15 amending the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Aug. 1, 2021, Europ.T.S. No. 213.
4.
Merabishvili v. Georgia, No. 72508/13, June 14, 2016, at ¶ 100.
5.
Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. REPORTS 1974, p. 253, 268 at
¶ 46.
6.
U.N. Charter art. 2, 2.
7.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties preamble, opened for signature May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
8.
Id. at art. 26.
9.
Id. at art. 31, 1. The term "good faith" also appears at Article 46(2) and Article
69(2)(b), regarding the grounds for, and consequences of, the invalidity of treaties.
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legally binding promises cannot rise above the chaos of an eternal
present in order to build a future in which predictive judgments can
be made.1 0 Few would wish to live in a world in which, as Jacques
Chirac said (in jest): "My promises only bind those who believe
them."" Indeed, in the world of international relations, "states
resent as a slur on their honor the slightest doubt about their good
faith."12
Closer to the subject of this article, the Statute of the Council of
Europe requires its members to "collaborate sincerely and
effectively" in pursuit of the organization's human rights aims. 13
There is, thus, a connection between this presumption of good faith
and the Court's doctrine of a margin of appreciation. "The doctrine
of the margin of appreciation has always been meant as a tool to
define relations between the domestic authorities and the Court."14
As Luzius Wildhaber observed when President of the Court, the
"essence" of the margin of appreciation doctrine is that Strasbourg
should recognize "limits on its own power of assessment or
appreciation either on practical grounds (for example the
remoteness, physical or otherwise, of the material events) or on
what one might call deferential grounds (that is the deference owed
to the policy decisions of democratic national institutions)."1 5
Wildhaber was quick to point out the limits of this deference.
The Court should not substitute its own view "unless the
conclusions that have actually been drawn are plainly unreasonable
or arbitrary, or unless the measures in question are in conflict with
the normal exercise of democratic rights." 16 The Court always
retains its supervisory jurisdiction. And it is worth noting that this
deference has nothing to do with how such conclusions are cloaked,
or what reasons are offered for them. The Court finds no margin of

10. To be sure, good faith is not naivet6. Even nuclear superpowers recognized that the
process of drawing down their armaments could only proceed under the belief that such
respect is possible. Hence Ronald Reagan's frequent invocation of a Russian proverb during
negotiations with his counterpart Mikhail Gorbachev: T(OBepHi, Ho HpoBepHu (Trust, but
verify). See Signing of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and ShorterRange Missiles (INF Treaty), Dec. 8, 1987, Washington D.C., https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=DXWbgOqtv-0.
11. Paul Taylor, Jacques Chirac, France'sLovable Failure, POLITICO, Sept. 27, 2019.
12. Michel Virally, Review Essay: Good Faith in Public InternationalLaw, 77 AMER. J.
INT'L L. 130, 131 (Jan. 1983).
13. Statute of the Council of Europe art. 3, opened for signature May 5, 1949, CETS No.
1 (emphasis added).
14. A & Others v. United Kingdom, No. 3455/05, Feb. 19, 2009, at ¶ 184.
15. Luzius Wildhaber, Address on the "Journ6e de R6flexion" on Reform of the
Convention System," Strasbourg, June 8, 2000, reprinted in LUzIUS WILDHABER, THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 1998-2006: HISTORY, ACHIEVEMENTS, REFORM 108-09

(Engel, 2006).
16. Id.
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appreciation upon a conclusion that what has "actually" occurred
differs from a pretextual conclusion. That is because, as Wildhaber
stated elsewhere, "This area of discretion is a necessary element
inherent in the nature of international jurisdiction when applied to
democratic States that respect the rule of law." 17 Further, "just as
democracy furnishes the raison d' itre and the justification for the
margin of appreciation, it also establishes its limits. In other words,
so the margin
as we approach the core operation of democracy ...
of appreciation contracts almost to vanishing point." 18

Protocol 15 adds a reference to both that doctrine and the
principle of subsidiarity to the Convention's preamble. 19 The
connection between the margin of appreciation doctrine and Article
18 remains clear there as well. As reflected in the Explanatory
Report to the protocol, these concepts recognize that the Member
States are "in principle better placed" than Strasbourg to determine
how the Convention applies and should be implemented in their own
unique and local circumstances.2 0 The margin of appreciation "goes
hand in hand with supervision under the Convention system. In this

respect, the role of the Court is to review whether decisions taken
by national authorities are compatible with the Convention, having
due regard to the State's margin of appreciation." 21

When such a review reveals bad faith in the restriction of rights
protected by the Convention, Article 18 is triggered. That this tool
was intended to be used against authoritarian revanchism with
more vigor than the Court has undertaken to use it is the argument
of the next two sections, respectively.
III. THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES:
GUARDING AGAINST "REASONS OF STATE"

This section recounts the drafting of, and debates over, what
became Article 18. The history is short but packed with evidence of
17. Luzius Wildhaber, A Constitutional Future for the European Court of Human
Rights, 23 HUMAN RIGHTS L. J. 161, 162 (2002) (emphasis added).
18. Luzius Wildhaber, Address to the Danish Section of the International Commission
of Jurists and Danish PEN, Louisiana Museum, Humlebmk, Mar. 18, 2006, reprinted in
WILDHABER, supra note 15, at 231.
19. Art. 1, Protocol No. 15 amending the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, Strasbourg, June 24, 2013 (inserting at the end of the preamble:
"Affirming that the High Contracting Parties, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity,
have the primary responsibility to secure the rights and freedoms defined in this Convention
and the Protocols thereto, and that in doing so they enjoy a margin of appreciation, subject to
the supervisory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights established by this
Convention,").
20. Explanatory Report, Protocol No. 15, amending the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ¶ 9, https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/
Protocol 15_explanatoryreport_ENG.pdf.
21. Id.
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the link between what became the doctrine of a margin of
appreciation and the prohibition on pretextual restriction of rights
established in Article 18. It also provides evidence that Article 18
was intended to prevent backsliding by states into dangerously
authoritarian practices violating rights for "reasons of state."
Pierre-Henri Teitgen was chairman of the International
Juridical Section of the (unofficial) European Movement that
drafted a first version of the Convention. (He would soon become
the rapporteur to the Committee on Legal and Administrative
Questions that helped prepare what became its final text.) 22 In
the general debate on that avant-projet, held August 19, 1949 at the
first session of the newly created Consultative Assembly (the
original name of the Parliamentary Assembly), Teitgen observed
that the first threat to freedom "is the eternal reason of State." He
explained:
Behind the State, whatever its form, were it even democratic,
there ever lurks as a permanent temptation, this reason of
State.
Montesquieu said: Whoever has power, is tempted to abuse
it. Even parliamentary majorities are in fact sometimes
tempted to abuse their power. Even in our democratic
countries we must be on guard against this temptation of
succumbing to reasons of State. 23
In his peroration, Teitgen described a gate at Buchenwald
inscribed "Just or unjust, the Fatherland," before summoning his
ultimate point:
I think that from our first Session we can unanimously
proclaim that in Europe there will henceforth only be just
fatherlands.

I think we can now unanimously confront

'reasons of State' with the only sovereignty worth dying for,
worthy in all circumstances of being defended, respected and
safeguarded-the sovereignty of justice and of law. 24
Most of those following after Teitgen echoed his sentiments. The
Italian politician Mario Cingolani, with the European Movement's

draft Convention in hand, observed "that it is easy for one who has
experienced the horrors of a dictatorship, wallowing in blood and
filth, to appreciate the importance of such a plan," before listing the
22. FIRST SITTING OF THE COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE QUESTIONS,
COLLECTED EDITION OF THE "TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES" OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS / COUNCIL OF EUROPE = RECUEIL DES TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES DE LA
CONVENTION EUROP ENNE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME / CONSEIL LE L'EUROPE Vol. I, p. 154
(Martinus Nijhoff 1975) [hereinafter, Travaux pr6paratoires, Vol. __, p. __.].

23.
24.

Remarks of M. Teitgen, Aug. 19, 1949. Travaux pr6paratoires, Vol. I, p. 40.
Id. at 50.
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many "unbelievable encroachments on our rights" of which such
regimes were capable. 25 He was followed by Bjorn Kraft of
Denmark, who put the point, and the danger, in terms that looked
backward in time as well as forward:
We should not forget also that in States where the
fundamental rights of freedom were thought to be secured to
man, those rights were first undermined and then brutally
trampled down. Therefore, the rights of man in Western
Europe must be not just an empty confession, but a real
guardian for the individual human being against a decline
which might very well set in without this protection, even
though the external form of democracy is preserved. 26
Karl Wistrand, of Sweden, warned against future threats of a
quietly creeping totalitarianism, akin to the arbitrary measures of
Nazism, that merited a well-functioning human rights court: "I feel
that such a plan would for a long time restrict any attemps [sic] to
create, in a freely governed State, a situation which might lead
towards a totalitarian r6gime, it may be by processes whose danger
had not at first been realised by public opinion." 27 The words of
former Nuremburg prosecutor Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe carried
weight as he argued for "a system of collective security against
tyranny and oppression. It is not enough to possess freedom:

positive action must be taken to defend it."28
These remarks, and others like them in these early debates,
draw our attention to the principle behind what became Article 18
of the Convention: the need for state signatories to guard, and be
guarded against, themselves. Put more succinctly and more recently
by the late Brian Simpson, the fundamental problem is that human
rights treaties, if they are any good, "are trouble to governments.
Their very reason for existence is the belief that governments are
the major delinquents." 29

Maxwell-Fyfe (one of the rapporteurs key to the drafting of the
first version of the Convention and widely regarded as the primary
author, and later chair of the Committee on Legal and
Administrative Questions that took up the draft Convention in the
25.
26.
27.
28.
p. 120.

Remarks
Remarks
Remarks
Remarks

of M. Cingolani, Aug. 19, 1949. Travaux pr6paratoires, Vol. I, p. 62.
of M. Kraft, Aug. 19, 1949, Travaux pr6paratoires, Vol. I, p. 66.
of M. Wistrand, Aug. 19, 1949, Travaux pr6paratoires, Vol. I, p. 84.
of Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, Aug. 19, 1949, Travaux pr6paratoires, Vol. I,

29. A. W. BRIAN SIMPSON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE END OF EMPIRE 12 (OUP, 2001). See
also Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes, 54 INT'L ORG. 217 (Spring
2000) ("Unlike international institutions governing trade, monetary, environmental, or
security policy, international human rights institutions are not designed primarily to regulate
policy externalities arising from societal interactions across borders, but to hold governments
accountable for purely internal activities.").
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Consultative Assembly) explained: "We do not desire by
sentimentality in drafting to give evilly disposed persons the
opportunity to create a totalitarian Government which will destroy
human rights altogether". 3 0 This, he further explained, was hardly
a theoretical concern. Noting the shadow of the coup d'6tat
accomplished the prior year in Czechoslovakia, Maxwell-Fyfe
recalled "the retrogressive steps by which a democratic constitution
may be overthrown: by this Convention we give a warning, a
challenge and a first counter-stroke to the intending tyrant." 3 1 At
the annual dinner of the Grotius Society, he arrogated for himself
the words of Brutus in Shakespeare's Julius Caesar to comment on
the draft Convention "which I recently piloted through the
European Assembly," Sir David observed:
Anyone who has had to study the onset of totalitarianism
would agree that there is a tide in the affairs of States which
taken at the flood sweeps on its people and leaves them high
and dry on the rocks of tyranny. Nevertheless, there is
always a moment when the guiding lights of democracy and
reason, though burning low, are not extinguished. The
problem is how these lights can be tended in time. We believe
that an impartial and objective examination by an
international body of the alleged infringements of a generally
accepted code of individual freedom would illuminate the
dangers for all good democrats to see. We believe, further,
that when the true implications of the situation are seen, a
stand against the encroachments of tyranny would be
made. 32
The ur-text for Article 18, in which awareness of the need to
guard against Teitgen's first threat to freedom, can be found in the
July 1949 draft Convention presented by the European Movement.
Its Article 3 provided:
The rights specified in Articles 1 and 2 shall be subject only
to such limitations as are in conformity with the general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations and as are
prescribed by law for:
a) Protecting the legal rights of others;

30.
31.
32.

Remarks of M. Maxwell-Fyfe, Aug. 19, 1949, Travaux pr6paratoires, Vol. I, p. 118.
Id. at 120.
Hartley Shawcross et al., Grotius Dinner, in 36 TRANSACTIONS OF THE GROTIUS
SOCIETY 56 (1950).
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b) Meeting the just requirements of morality, public order
(including the safety of the community), and the general
welfare.33

A month later, the Committee on Legal and Administrative
Questions built on this draft provision. On Teitgen's motion, the
Committee unanimously approved language that became the basis
for Article 6 of the resolution presented in his report to the
Consultative Assembly on September 5:
In the exercise of these rights, and in the enjoyment of the
freedoms guaranteed by the Convention, no limitations shall
be imposed except those established by the law, with the sole
object of ensuring the recognition and respect for the rights
and freedoms of others, or with the purpose of satisfying the
just requirements of public morality, order and security in a
democratic society. 34
An information document compiled by the Court's Registry
concluded that this "constitutes all that can be regarded as a
precursor of the present Article 18."35
Even at this early stage, one can see a connection between what
would become a judicially created doctrine of a margin of
appreciation and the beginnings of Article 18. Subject to three
conditions, the resolution provided that every Member State "shall
be entitled to establish the rules by which the guaranteed rights and
freedoms shall be organised and protected within its territory." 36
Those conditions were a prohibition on various forms of
discrimination, adherence to "the general principles of law as
recognized by civilised nations," and the restriction found in this
incipient Article 18.37 In other words, the entitlement to deference
that a state deserved in protecting these human rights was
contingent on its continued good faith in doing so within these
express parameters.

Here we see the return of Teitgen's categorical rejection of
pretextual "reasons of state" as a basis to restrict these rights. It is,
again, twinned with an appreciation of what might be called the
33. Draft European Convention on Human Rights, Travaux pr6paratoires, Vol. I,
Appendix, p. 298.
34. Compare Minutes of the Sitting of the Committee for Legal and Administrative
Affairs, Aug. 30, 1949, Travaux pr6paratoires, Vol. I, p. 178-80 with Article 6, Resolution of
the Committee on Legal and Administrative Affairs, in Report presented by M. Pierre-Henri
Teitgen, Doc. 77, Sept. 5, 1949, Travaux pr6paratoires, Vol. I, p. 230.
35. Information document prepared by the Registry, Preparatory Work on Article 18 of
the European Convention on Human Rights, CDH (75) 11 (Mar. 10, 1975), p. 2, n.6.
36. Article 4, Resolution of the Committee on Legal and Administrative Affairs, in
Report presented by M. Pierre-Henri Teitgen, Doc. 77, Sept. 5, 1949, Travaux pr6paratoires,
Vol. I, p. 230.
37. Id. Art. 5-7.
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seed of a margin of appreciation doctrine. Recognizing "the principle
of international law according to which each State reserves the right
to organise the exercise within its territories of the guaranteed
freedoms," the Committee expressed its view that "any restriction
on a guaranteed freedom for motives based, not on the common
good or general interest, but on reasons of State (Article 6)" be
prohibited. 38
In presenting his report to the Consultative Assembly on
September 7, 1949, Teitgen maintained this connection between
respect for what we would today call subsidiarity or a margin of
appreciation and the need to be wary of pretextual restrictions on
rights:

Thus, an international Convention shall establish and give a
general definition of a list of guaranteed freedoms. Each
country shall, through its own legislation, determine the
conditions in which these guaranteed liberties shall be
exercised within its territory, and, in defining the practical
conditions for the operation of these guaranteed liberties,
each country shall have a very wide freedom of action.
But-and this is the essential point-the international
collective guarantee will have, as its purpose, to ensure that
no State shall in fact aim at suppressing the guaranteed
freedoms by means of minor measures which, while made
with the pretext of organising the exercise of these freedoms
on its territory, or of safeguarding the letter of the law, have
the opposite effect. That is the reason for Articles 5, 6, and 7
of the draft Resolution submitted to you. 39
Teitgen said Article 6 was "of capital importance" in this trio, "a
fundamental principle." A state fulfilled its duty when it limits
rights in pursuit of the common good; this was not only permissible
and legitimate, he said, but necessary. The danger arose, Teitgen
warned, when the state legislated in bad faith:
But when it intervenes to suppress, to restrain and to limit
these freedoms for, this time, reasons of state; to protect
itself according to the political tendency which it represents,
against an opposition which it considers dangerous; to
destroy fundamental freedoms which it ought to make itself
responsible for co-ordinating and guaranteeing, then it is

38. Report presented by M. Pierre-Henri Teitgen, Doc. A 290, Sept. 5, 1949, at ¶ 14,
Travaux pr6paratoires, Vol. I, p. 222.
39. Debate on Report No. 77, Remarks of M. Pierre-Henri Teitgen, Rapporteur of the
Committee on Legal and Administrative Questions, Sept. 7, 1949, Travaux pr6paratoires, Vol.
I, p. 276.
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against public interest if it intervenes. Then the laws which
it passes are contrary to the principle of the international
guarantee.40

Teitgen's remarks, from beginning to end, are speckled by his
concern for "reasons of State." This was clearly a concern recalling
past experience. But his eyes were also on the future. As the Iron
Curtain divided Europe, he nevertheless imagined a future Council
of Europe expanded beyond that artificial border:
This international European guarantee will give us also a
protection against a possible return of those aggressions,
made for reasons of State. . . . Other countries will come to

join us; the doors are wide open and we are ready to receive
them.

If some of us sometimes raise certain questions, it is not
indeed from hate nor reproach of the unhappy peoples of
those countries, but from anxiety. We ask ourselves if they
are sufficiently sure of themselves, sufficiently armed so
that, if one day misfortune should once more overwhelm us,
they will be able to resist.4 1

Teitgen perhaps imagined a future for then Czechoslovakia,
overcome by Communist coup the year before. Or countries further
east. It is unlikely that he could have extended his imagination to
include the then Soviet Union. But he recognized the problem:
legislation in bad faith, disguising "reasons of State." Or, to put the
same issue the opposite way, Teitgen posited that States had no
reason to fear the jurisdiction over them of a Commission or a Court:
"what danger will they be running in accepting this, if they are
really resolved to keep to this undertaking in good faith?"42
By spring 1950, a committee of experts meeting in Strasbourg

was hard at work drafting a Convention, in compliance with a
recommendation by the Assembly and a decision by the Committee
of Ministers. Its work retained the essential concept that Teitgen
and others advanced in the preceding debates, though in forms
that sometimes changed the breadth of limitations legitimately
established by law the way an accordion player changes the size of
the instrument's bellows.4 3 Charting the course of those expansions
40. Id. at 278.
41. Id. at 292.
42. Remarks of M. Pierre-Henri Teitgen, Sept. 8, 1949, Travaux pr6paratoires, Vol. II,
p. 178.
43. For example, Article 6 of the preliminary draft convention (Doc. A 833) completed
15 Feb. 1950 states: "In the exercise of these rights and in the enjoyment of the freedoms
secured by the Convention, no limitation shall be imposed except those established by the law,
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and contractions is of limited utility to the argument of this paper.
By June 1950, a conference of senior officials had produced a draft
that shifted some of these particular justifications for restriction to
certain rights while also incorporating a general clause, Article
13(2) that approaches the more general sentiment we recognize
today: "The restrictions to the said [later "these"] rights and
freedoms shall not be applied for any purpose other than those for
which they have been adopted [later "prescribed"]."44 By August 4,
1950, both the numeration and text acquired the form they have
today.4 5
The draft convention was returned to the Consultative Assembly
for debate. The end result is well known. But it is worth concluding
with one last reference to Teitgen's linkage between the protection
of fundamental rights and the nature of the political regime, argued
before the Assembly in mid-August 1950, two months before the
final draft of the Convention was opened for signature:
The State, in a democracy, may limit an individual freedom
in the interests of the freedom of all, in order to allow the
collective exercise of all the freedoms, in the general interest
of a superior freedom or right, in the public interest of the
nation. The restriction which it imposes is a legitimate one
precisely by reason of the fact that this is the goal which is
aimed at: it sets a limit upon freedom in the general interest,
in the interest of the freedom of all.
In a totalitarian regime, reasons of State are supposed to

justify any State intervention. The State arrogates to itself
the right to limit individual freedom, not in the sole name of
a higher freedom, not in order to permit the exercise of the
freedom of all, but simply to defend its own dictatorship, its
totalitarian grip. Reasons of State alone are considered
sufficient justification for its interference.
Individual freedom, in our democratic countries, is protected
by our democratic institutions. Consequently, the safeguards
required, too, are inseparable from these institutions.46
If a state were to pretend to legitimate reasons that were not in
fact the true basis for a restriction of rights, this was a sign of
with the sole object of ensuring the recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of
others, or with the purpose of satisfying the just requirements of public morality and order
and national security and integrity (and solidarity) as well as the functioning of
administration and justice in a democratic society." Travaux pr6paratoires, Vol. III, p. 238.
44. Travaux pr6paratoires, Vol. IV, p.190; id. at 226.
45. Travaux pr6paratoires, Vol. V, p. 84.
46. Travaux pr6paratoires, Vol. V, p. 290-92.
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democratic slippage. Perhaps some dangers to the protection of
human rights came as wolves in sheep's clothing. For Teitgen, a
pretextual claim to protect rights that really only furthered the
interests of a non-democratic regime was a wolf that came as a wolf.
IV. THE DIFFICULT TASK OF OVERCOMING
THE PRESUMPTION OF GOOD FAITH

Former President Raimondi opened the Court in January 2019
noting "one of the indicators of the decline in the rule of law is
undoubtedly the application of Article 18" and that its violation is
on the rise: "[it] has been breached only twelve times, but five times
during the year 2018 alone." 4 7
There is a loss of historical memory in President Raimondi's
remarks. Its theme is contrary to the stark evidence in the Travaux
that the drafters of the Convention feared that their work could be
undone by the intrinsic tendency of governments of all types
including consolidated democracies-to accumulate and abuse their
powers.4 8 Instead, President Raimondi lamented "Men and women
of my generation had, for a long time, taken the view that once
democracy was established it could not be undone. We were sure
that democracy was here to stay." 4 If his generation indeed
harbored such ahistorical and unempirical beliefs, these were
certainly not shared by the generation that preceded his own. All of
the evidence of at-risk democracies that he cited were forewarned
by the post-War generation that drafted the Convention:
There is a risk of democracy being dismantled: first by
undermining

the

rights

of

the

opposition

and

the

independence of the justice system, then by suppressing the
media, and even by imprisoning opponents. Political leaders
whose intention it is to dispense with the checks and
balances, will seek to weaken, or even to eliminate, those
institutional actors which nevertheless remain essential to
47. Solemn hearing for the opening of the judicial year of the European Court of Human
Rights Opening speech by President Guido Raimondi Strasbourg, Jan. 25, 2019, at 5-6,
available at: https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Speech_20190125_RaimondiJYENG.pdf.
48. Even before discussion of the European Movement/Maxwell-Fyfe drafts and Teitgen
Report, this sentiment was clear. See, e.g., Remarks of Lord (Walter) Layton, Aug. 16, 1949
("Purely paper declarations, however, are rightly discredited. Our statement will have force
only if it is converted into action and the most immediate and practical way of doing this is
by the adoption of a Charter of Human Rights, coupled with a definite method of
enforcement.... I only impress its importance ... as a means of strengthening the resistance
in all our countries against insidious attempts to undermine our democratic way of life from
within or without, and thus to give to Western Europe as a whole greater political
stability;..."). Travaux pr6paratoires, Vol. I, p. 30.
49. Speech by President Guido Raimondi Strasbourg, Jan. 25, 2019, supra note 47, at
page 5.
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the democratic process. They see the justice system, the
press, the opposition as "enemies of the people."5 0

If President Raimondi's view represents the view of the Court, it
is no surprise that the test for applying Article 18 is an exceedingly
difficult one to pass. The Court describes this as "a very exacting
standard of proof." 51 What this means in practice can be discerned
from the small number of cases in which the Court has found Article
18 to be violated.
In terms of the scope of its applicability, the Court has limited
the reach of Article 18 only to those Convention rights explicitly or
impliedly permitting some restriction. Complaints seeking to apply

Article 18 beyond those rights have been declared incompatible with
the Convention ratione materiae. There has been some pushback
within the Court on this restrictive interpretation. But so far, the
Court has only found a violation of Article 18 in conjunction with
Article 5.52 This article does not focus on the limitations the Court
has perceived in applying Article 18, though that is certainly a
related issue. 53

This article does take issue with the extreme reluctance to
evaluate a case under Article 18 and the cramped notion of what
counts as evidence of an Article 18 violation even in those
circumstances when the Court is willing to consider a complaint on
its merits. The Court will only consider whether a complaint raises
an issue under Article 18 when the allegation that ulterior motives
are being disguised by pretextual claims "appears to be a
fundamental aspect of the case." 54 If there exist claims of a plurality
of purposes behind a restriction, some legitimate and some not, the
Court will seek alternatives to calling the state out, asking "whether
the prescribed purpose invariably expunges the ulterior one,
whether the mere presence of an ulterior purpose contravenes
Article 18, or whether there is some intermediary answer." 55
The Court has shifted its approach over time with regard to
acceptable evidence and burdens of proof. Initially, even if a prima
facie case were to be made by the applicant that the State had
pretextually restricted rights to cover its true, improper purpose,
50. Id.
51. Merabishvili v. Georgia, supra note 4, at ¶ 101.
52. Directorate of the Jurisconsult, Guide on Article 18 of the European Convention on
Human Rights (Aug. 31, 2020), at 8.
53. An argument that the Court should interpret Article 18 purposively, not
restrictively, and apply it broadly to cover all Convention rights and freedoms is found in Part
II of the Third Party Intervention of the European Human Rights Advocacy Centre (EHRAC)
and Professor Jeffrey Kahn in Navalnyy and Ofitserov v. Russia (Application No. 78193/17),
pending now before the Court.
54. Merabishvili v. Georgia, No. 72508/13, Nov. 28, 2017 [Grand Chamber], at ¶ 291.
55. Id. at ¶ 292.
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there was no "burden-shifting" to the State to prove otherwise. The
burden of proof always remained with the applicant.56 Thus, for
example, the Court accepted in Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v.
Russia that "the circumstances surrounding the applicants'
criminal case may be interpreted as supporting the applicants' claim

of improper motives." 57 And the Court expressed sympathy for the
fact that not every case would have "direct proof of improper
motives." Nevertheless, the Court rejected outright, without any
suggestion that Russia shoulder any heightened pleading burden, a
case built on "contextual evidence" because "even where the
appearances speak in favour of the applicant's claim of improper
motives, the burden of proof must remain with him or her."58
According to the Jurisconsult of the Court, this approach has
changed. 59 In connection with Article 18, the Court "no longer
applies the general presumption of good faith on the part of national
authorities or any special rules with regard to proof."6 0 Rather than
the "stricter standard" described above, the Court asserts its rule of
decision not to place the burden of proof on any party but to examine
"all the material before it irrespective of its origin." 61 This is,
perhaps, a recognition that the very nature of such a claim against
a Member State presents (as the Jurisconsult euphemistically
phrases it) "specific evidentiary difficulties."62
It is surely a welcome development that the Court should no
longer single out Article 18 for more difficult pleading requirements,
applying instead "its usual approach to proof." 63 But this concession

is hardly game-changing.

What the Court has characterized

as its "very exacting standard of proof,"

appears to require

proof." 64

"incontrovertible and direct
And although here, too, the
Court has subsequently insisted that it will not "restrict itself to

56. Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, No. 5829/04, Nov. 28, 2011, at ¶ 256.
57. Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia, Nos. 11082/06 and 13772/05, Oct. 25, 2013,
¶ 901 ("Thus, it is clear that the authorities were trying to reduce political influence of
"oligarchs", that business projects of Yukos ran counter to the petroleum policy of the State,
and that the State was one of the main beneficiaries of the dismantlement of Yukos.")
(internal citations omitted).
58. Id. at ¶¶ 902-03.
59. The Jurisconsult, a member of the Court's Registry, is tasked with "ensuring the
quality and consistency" of the Court's case-law. See Rule 18B, Rules of Court (Oct. 18, 2021),
available at: https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/RulesCourtENG.pdf.
60. Directorate of the Jurisconsult, supra note 52, at 20.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, supra note 56, at ¶ 260. See also OAO Neftyanaya
Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, Case No. 14902/04 (Sept. 20, 2011) at ¶ 663 ("The Court further
notes that in order to hold a member State liable under this provision an applicant should be
able to furnish the Court with an incontrovertible and direct proof in support of his or her
allegations.").
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direct proof in relation to complaints under Article 18,"65 in practice
and with limited exception, only where the State was quite literally
caught in the act has the Court been willing to categorize such
actions as an Article 18 violation. 66
Why such strictures, followed by reversals, feints, and weaves?
These high hurdles and evidentiary standards evince a hesitancy by
the Court to deploy the powerful anti-deference device that Article
18 is. It is perhaps extraordinary enough that States would be
willing to expose themselves to judgment by an international
judicial body on a topic as sensitive as human rights. A violation of
Article 18 goes a step further still. In essence, such a finding accuses
the state of a cover-up, a lie about what it has really done. And as
noted before, "states resent as a slur on their honor the slightest
doubt about their good faith." 67
That is all perfectly understandable. One can see in these cases
a real reluctance to advance the final step from the factual
determination that "the authorities have not been able to
demonstrate that they acted in good faith" 68 (or, even more
delicately, "the conclusion to be drawn from this finding is that the
assumption that the authorities acted in good faith was
undermined") 69 to the legal conclusion that there has been a
violation of Article 18. In both cases just cited, the Court observed
"that conclusion in itself is not sufficient to assume that Article 18
was breached, and it remains to be seen whether there is proof that
the authorities' actions were actually driven by improper reasons."7 0
But reluctance to deploy the tool devised for just such situations
does not justify avoidance of such judgment in cases that merit it.
It is to one such case, Russia, that this article now turns in
conclusion.

65. Merabishvili v. Georgia, Case No. 72508/13, Grand Chamber, ¶ 316 (Nov. 28, 2017).
66. In two cases concerning Azerbaijan, the Court accepted contextual evidence,
relaxing the Khodorkovskiy "direct and incontrovertible proof' standard. Rasul Jafarov v.
Azerbaijan, Case No. 69981/14, ¶ 158 (Mar. 17, 2016); and Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan,
Case No. 15172/13, ¶ 142 (May 22, 2014). However, this alternative approach has never been
applied when Russia is the State responding to the complaint. Likewise, two other cases were
analyzed by the Court without reference to the "direct and incontrovertible proof' standard.
Lutsenko v. Ukraine, Case No. 6492/11, ¶¶ 107-10 (July 3, 2012), and Tymoshenko v.
Ukraine, Case No. 49872/11, ¶¶ 295-301 (Apr. 30, 2013). But in both cases, the Article 18
violation was nevertheless based on explicit written documents by high officials.
67. Virally, supra note 12.
68. Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, Case No. 15172/13, ¶ 141 (May 22, 2014).
69. Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, Case No. 69981/14, ¶ 157 (Mar. 17, 2016).
70. Id. at ¶ 157; and Mammadov, supra note 68, at ¶ 141.
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V. RUSSIA AND ARTICLE 18

President Raimondi emphasized one statistic in particular: "the
high number of applications lodged against the Russian Federation
(almost 12,000)." 71 Reflecting on this fact while the political
institutions of the Council of Europe wrestled with the question of
Russia's continued membership, Judge Raimondi observed that "the
significant volume reflects, in my view, the degree of trust shown by
Russian nationals in the European mechanism for the protection of
human rights and the importance it represents for them."7 2 A less
politic, but more direct way of stating this reflection would have
been to emphasize its flip side: the degree of distrust that Russians
had for their own governmental mechanisms to protect their rights.
Raimondi took the volume of petitions to Strasbourg from a
particular country to be "an indicator of the effectiveness of
Convention implementation in that country."7 3 The same might be
said of the narrower statistic of Article 18 claims. Only Azerbaijan
has been found to violate Article 18 more than Russia, though
Russia holds the undesirable distinction of being the Member State
that, starting with the first violation, has most significantly shaped
the Court's caselaw on the topic. What does that indicate about
Moscow's relationship to Strasbourg?
This section argues that the Court has weakened the important
role of Article 18 in the Convention system by establishing too high
a standard for reaching justifiable conclusions that it has been
violated by bad-faith restrictions on rights. This is the mirror image
of the complaint that the Court applies its margin of appreciation
doctrine too narrowly when Member States interpret the
Convention in good faith. There are several mechanisms that the
Court might change to restore Article 18 to its proper place in the
Convention. For example, it might require less than a hand caught
in the cookie jar, in flagrante delicto, to conclude that a violation has
occurred.
Another option might be more willing to accept as evidence the
cumulative effect of cases in which the Court has either found an
Article 18 violation. Russian violations of Article 18, as well as
those cases that come closest but pulled back from the brink, have
all occurred under Vladimir Putin's dominion, with increasing
frequency and increasingly similar modus operandi. One must work

71.
72.
73.

Speech by President Guido Raimondi Strasbourg, Jan. 25, 2019, supra note 47.

Id.
Id. at 2.

134

JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

[Vol. 31

hard not to see a pattern and practice in the cases that accumulate.
Why should the Court shield its eyes, beginning each case anew on
a blank slate?
Future cases should be considered contextually, not as "fresh
starts" with the record wiped clean. Tentatively, the Court has
expressed its willingness to consider the repetitive nature of similar
state action against a single applicant or applicants, but only in a

tightly confined timeframe and landscape. But, as this article
demonstrates, the history of Article 18 supports a broadening of this
approach. One of the earliest assertions of the importance of a
human rights convention to prevent democratic backsliding
also heralded it "as the acid test of whether countries should be
admitted to this Council of a democratic Europe." 74 The increasing
applicability of Article 18 to confront what Teitgen called "Reasons
of State," including those hidden behind pretextual reasons like a
wolf in sheep's clothing, is another acid test. This one, however,
concerns not whether to admit a state, but whether to continue to
presume its good faith in the maintenance of its international legal
obligations under the Convention.
What does this much broader contextual reading look like? 75
Starting with the first case in the history of the Convention to find
a violation of Article 18, Gusinskiy v. Russia, Russia has tracked a
steady departure from the norms and standards of a rule-of-law,
democratic state that are enshrined in both its Constitution and the
international treaties it signed to become a member of the Council
of Europe. The Court should take this recent history into account
despite the non-repetitive nature of the applicants, though not the
Member States's modus operandi (as noted below)-as relevant
context in determining whether Russia has violated Article 18 in
future cases. Russia has a track record that is relevant in cases that
depend so much on ascertaining good or bad faith conduct.
Months into Vladimir Putin's first term as President of Russia,
mass media oligarch Vladimir Gusinskiy was coerced by the
Russian Minister for Press and Mass Communications to sign away

the flagship of his media empire in exchange for his freedom from
criminal custody. A few years later, oil oligarch Mikhail
Khodorkovskiy was arrested on the tarmac of a Siberian airstrip
and brought to Moscow to be stripped of his Yukos oil company on
highly dubious embezzlement charges. Two years later, Russia's
leading opposition activist, Alexei Navalnyy, was convicted on the
74. See, supra note 48 (remarks of Lord Layton), Aug. 16, 1949.
75. This section draws from Part I of the Third Party Intervention of the European
Human Rights Advocacy Centre and Professor Jeffrey Kahn, Navalnyy and Ofitserov v.
Russia, Case No. 78193/17 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 14, 2020).
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same embezzlement theory to strip him of his right to seek elected
office. In between and after these events, these and other opposition
figures in Russia brought numerous cases to Strasbourg, winning
most of them.
All three of these men brought Article 18 claims to Strasbourg.
Gusinskiy could point to the sale agreement he was forced to sign in
a jail cell in the inexplicable presence of the Press Minister. 76
Caught in flagrante delicto, Russia became the first state found to
be in violation of Article 18-just six years after having ratified the
Convention. By the time of Khodorkovskiy's and Navalnyy's cases,
Russian authorities had learned to hide the smoking gun. The
Strasbourg Court acknowledged as "probably the strongest
argument in favour of [Khodorkovskiy's] complaint under Article
18" the findings of numerous European courts that his prosecution
was politically motivated, even going so far as to admit
that the applicant's case may raise a certain suspicion as to

the real intent of the authorities, and that this state of
suspicion might be sufficient for the domestic courts to refuse
extradition, deny legal assistance, issue injunctions against
the Russian Government, make pecuniary awards, etc. 77
Nevertheless, the Court stopped short of finding a violation,
because:
[Such suspicion] is not sufficient for this Court to conclude
that the whole legal machinery of the respondent State in the
present case was ab intio [sic] misused, that from the
beginning to the end the authorities were acting with bad
faith and in blatant disregard of the Convention. This is a
very serious claim which requires an incontrovertible and
direct proof. 78
This conclusion was perhaps all the more astonishing given
that the Court acknowledged that in this very case it had already
found that the authorities had pretextually claimed to arrest
Khodorkovskiy as a witness when their real reason was to arrest
him as a suspect, thus undermining the exercise of his rights ab
76. Gusinskiy v. Russia, App. No. 70276/01, ¶¶ 27-31, 75 (Nov. 10, 2004), https://hudoc.
echr.coe.int/fre?i=001-61767.
77. Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, App. No. 5829/04, ¶ 260 (Nov. 28, 2011), https://hudoc.
echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-104983.
78. Id.; see also OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, App. No. 14902/04, ¶665
(Sept. 20, 2011), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-106308 ("Apart from the findings
already made earlier, the Court finds no indication of any further issues or defects in the
proceedings against the applicant company which would enable it conclude [sic] that there
has been a breach of Article 18 of the Convention on account of the applicant company's claim
that the State had misused those proceedings with a view to destroying the company and
taking control of its assets.").
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initio.7 This had the effect of assuring the State's preferred venue

for trial, the highly suspect Basmanniy District Court that had
already earned a deserved reputation for operating at the end of
puppet strings and telephone lines to the political authorities.8 0
Navalnyy could not even get that far. The Court concluded that
Articles 6 and 7 of the Convention (under which Navalnyy alleged
that conviction under this embezzlement theory was unforeseeable
and the criminal proceedings were arbitrary and unfair) lacked
"express or implied restrictions that may form the subject of the
Court's examination under Article 18 of the Convention." 81 His
complaint in that regard was therefore rejected as incompatible
ratione materiae with the Convention. 82 His case was preceded by
many others that shared both its dismissive outcome as well as the
mounting suspicions that deference to Russia's presumed good faith
in complying with its treaty obligations was not fully warranted. 83
None of these cases should have been surprising to anyone
familiar with Russia. Judicial independence is the exception, not the
rule, in Russian history. Its Soviet era low point is well documented.
In the words of a former Commissar of Justice, "our judge is above
all a politician, a worker in the political field," whose courtroom
is, and still remains, the only thing it can be by its nature as
an organ of the government power-a weapon for the
A
safeguarding of the interests of a given ruling class ...
club is a primitive weapon, a rifle is a more efficient one, the
most efficient is the court . . .84

79.

Khodorkovskiy

v.

Russia, App. No. 5829/04 at

¶¶

142, 254.

80. BACMAHHOE HPABOCYgHE: YPOKH CAMOOBOPOHbI: HOCOBHE gJIH AT BOKATOB:
HPOMITH H HEPEgAH gPYFOMY [BASMANNY JUSTICE: LESSONS IN SELF-DEFENSE: A HANDBOOK
FOR LAWYERS TO READ AND PASS TO OTHERS] 77 (Karinna Moskalenko & Leonid Nikitinskii

eds., 2004).
81. Navalnyy and Ofitserov v. Russia, App. Nos. 46632/13 & 28671/14, ¶ 129 (July 4,
2016), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre?i=001-161060.
82. Id. at ¶ 130.
83. Nemtsov v. Russia, App. No. 1774/11, ¶¶ 129-30 (July 31, 2014), https://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-145784 ("Having regard to those findings [viz. that the
applicant had been arrested, detained and convicted of an administrative offence arbitrarily
and unlawfully and that this had had an effect of preventing or discouraging him and others
from participating in protest rallies and engaging actively in opposition politics], the Court
considers that the complaint under Article 18 of the Convention raises no separate issue and
it is not necessary to examine whether, in this case, there has been a violation of that
provision."); Navalnyy and Yashin v. Russia, App. No. 76204/11, ¶¶ 116-17 (Dec. 4, 2014),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/rus?i=001-148286 (same); Frumkin v. Russia, App. No. 74568/12,
¶¶ 172-73 (Jan. 5, 2016), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-159762 (same); Kasparov v.
Russia, App. No. 53659/07, ¶¶ 73-74 (Oct. 11, 2016), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001167094 (same); Kasparov and Others v. Russia, App. No. 51988/07, ¶ 55 (Dec. 13, 2016),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-169473 (same).
84. VLADIMIR GSOVSKI, SOVIET CIVIL LAW 241 (Hesel E. Ynetema ed., 1948) (quoting
HHKOJIANI BACH JJbEBHMI KPbIJIEHKO, CYgOYCTPONICTBO PCbCP - JIEKLIHH HO TEOPHH H

HCTOPHH CYAOYCTPOHCTBO

206 (1923)).
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A persistent theme, varying only in degree, has been political
control of judicial institutions. In the Soviet Union, "there was no
such thing as an independent court of law, especially in political
cases. The verdict was determined not by the judiciary but by the
executive-the party-state authorities." 85

The hope poured into Boris Yeltsin's short, tumultuous decade
could not easily overcome seventy years of Soviet rule and centuries
of Tsarist autocracy. Substantial legal reforms were catalyzed by
Russia's quest for Council of Europe membership, which was
granted notwithstanding Russian noncompliance ab initio. 86 But

welcome statutory improvements do not always become entrenched
practice, especially with regard to judicial independence. 87 In the
words of the 19th-century Russian satirist Saltykov-Shchedrin:
"The severity of the laws is compensated by the non-obligatory
nature of their observance." 88
As in the past, courts in Russia today serve a dual purpose. In
ordinary cases, they accommodate individual rights and public
needs in a modern and often sophisticated way. But in political
cases, the judiciary remain susceptible to instrumental use as
political weapons. The distinction between "ordinary" and "political"
cases is an unwritten one, knowable ex post and determined by
exercise of power. This "dual-state" phenomenon has been well
documented as a feature of authoritarian regimes in general, and of
the post-Soviet Russian state in particular. 89 Concern over political
ARCHIE BROWN, THE RISE AND FALL OF COMMUNISM 577 (2009).
86. Eur. Par. Ass., Report on the Conformity of the Legal Order of the Russian
Federationwith Council of Europe Standards, Doc. AS/Bur/Russia (1994); Eur. Par. Ass.,
Report of the Political Affairs Committee on Russia's Request for Membership of the Council
of Europe, 1st Sess., Doc. No. 7443, (1996); Eur. Par. Ass., Opinion of the Committee on Legal
Affairs and Human Rights on Russia's applicationfor membership of the Council of Europe,
1st Sess., Doc. No. 7463, (1996); Peter Leuprecht, Innovations in the European System of
Human Rights Protection:Is Enlargement Compatible with Reinforcement, 8 TRANSNAT'L L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 313, 329 (1998) ("It is not without significance that, in its Opinion on
Russia's request for membership, the Parliamentary Assembly, while referring to Article 4 of
the Statute, actually departs from its wording by using the future tense[.]") (internal footnote
omitted).
87. See, e.g., Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, Report and Draft Resolution of the
Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights on Allegations of Politically-MotivatedAbuses
of the Criminal Justice System in Council of Europe Member States, EUR. PARL. ASS., 4th
Sess., Doc. No. 11993, (2009), at 4.3.4 & 4.3.5; Bill Bowring, Russia's Accession to the Council
of Europe and Human Rights: Compliance or Cross-Purposes?,6 E.H.R.L.R. 628-43 (1997);
Jeffrey Kahn, The Rule of Law Under Pressure: Russia and the European Human Rights
System, 44 REV. OF CENT. & E. EUR. L. 275-95 (2019).
88. STEPHEN WHITE, UNDERSTANDING RUSSIAN POLITICS 106 (2011).
89. See e.g., ERNST FRAENKEL, THE DUAL STATE: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE THEORY OF
DICTATORSHIP (1941); Kathryn Hendley, Are Russian Judges Still Soviet? 23 POST-SOVIET
AFFAIRS 240, 267 (2007); Kathryn Hendley Varieties of Legal Dualism: Making Sense of the
Role of Law in ContemporaryRussia 29 WISC. INT'L L. J. 234, 258 (2011); Kathryn Hendley,
To Go to Court or Not? The Evolution of Disputes in Russia, in A SOCIOLOGY OF JUSTICE IN
85.
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control of judicial proceedings in Russia leads courts in other
countries to refuse requests for extradition, unfreezing assets, or
other legal assistance.9 0
The crudest manifestation of the dual state, the infamous Soviet
practice of "telephone justice" (1exiecbonnoe npaBo» [telefonnoe
pravo]), is only one modus operandi of Russia's dual state. Scholars
provide evidence of political interference both in categories of cases
and specific trials. For example, defamation lawsuits are filed in
Russia at a per capita rate that is 100 times that found in the United
Kingdom, but "the largest share of defamation lawsuits is filed by
plaintiffs who hold state office" who both "win more often and they
receive larger moral compensation awards than ordinary citizens,
even including rich private business actors who probably have
access to the best legal representation that money can buy." 91 The
Court frequently notes how defamation suits are used by Russian
officials to suppress criticism on matters of public concern. 92 The
manipulation is almost always the same: a veneer of formal
compliance with Convention requirements issues from higher
judicial instances while lower judicial bodies nevertheless continue
to award damages to official plaintiffs without elaboration or
reasoning and in summary fashion. 93
Similarly, the most politically sensitive criminal cases in Russia
share the application of identical theories of culpability. Article 160
of the RF Criminal Code, embezzlement, has been the central
criminal charge in the prosecutions, inter alia, of both Alexei

RUSSIA 63-64 (Marina Kurkchiyan & Agnieszka Kubal eds., 2018). See also ANDERSASLUND,
RUSSIA'S CRONY CAPITALISM 51-52 (2019); KAREN DAWISHA, PUTIN'S KLEPTOCRACY: WHO
OWNS RUSSIA? 317 (2014); VLADIMIR GEL'MAN, AUTHORITARIAN RUSSIA: ANALYZING POSTSOVIET REGIME CHANGES 81 (2015); ALENA V. LEDENEVA, CAN RUSSIA MODERNISE? SISTEMA,
POWER NETWORKS AND INFORMAL GOVERNANCE 161-62 (2013); B. BOJIKOB [V. VOLKOV], A.
,MHTPHEBA [A. DMITRIEVA], M. rl034HaKOB [M. POZDNAKOV], K. THTAEB [K. TITAEV],
POCCHICKHE CY4bH: COIHOJIF'IECKOE HCCIIE4OBAHHE FPOqECCHH [RUSSIAN JUDGES: A
SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE PROFESSION] 210 (Hopma [Norma] 2015) ("The judge becomes a

bureaucrat, part of a large machine that limits his independence. The judge, in order to
continue to work in this system, assumes this role and agrees to it. This creates a unique
professional situation for the Russian judge. Beyond a purely academic discussion, i.e., on
specific legal issues, they turn out to be the most qualified of lawyers, but are outside the legal
discussion, outside the legal community.") [Translation by J. Kahn].
90. See, e.g., Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, supra note 87, at 37-38 n.159 (listing
decisions of courts in the U.K., Czech Republic, Lithuania, Switzerland, the Netherlands,
Estonia, Germany, Cyprus & Israel).
91. Maria Popova, Journalists,Judges and State Officials, in A SOCIOLOGY OF JUSTICE
IN RUSSIA 141-42 (Marina Kurkchiyan & Agnieszka Kubal eds., 2018).
92. Margulev v. Russia, No. 15449/09, Oct. 8, 2019, ¶ 50 (citing five cases). See also
Skudayeva v. Russia, No. 24014/07, June 5, 2019; Kharlamov v. Russia, No. 27447/07, Jan. 8,
2016; Krasulya v. Russia, No. 12365/03, May 22, 2007.
93. See, e.g., Margulev, at ¶ 52; Skudayeva, at ¶ 37; Krasulya, at ¶ 42.
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Navalnyy and Mikhail Khodorkovskiy.94 Article 160 is one of what
Jordan Gans-Morse calls "favored charges used to apply pressure"
on private enterprises targeted by predatory state officials:
Unlike crimes such as murder or theft, which are reported
to the police by citizens, these economic crimes require
proactive

investigation

by

legal

authorities,

providing

officials with significant discretion to probe a wide range of
firms .

.

. [A]fter 2003, the initial year of the Khodorkovsky

Affair, there was a notable increase in the number of
economic crimes uncovered by Ministry of Internal Affairs
investigators: Between 2003 and 2004, fraud- and
embezzlement-related cases, which since the late 1990s had
remained relatively constant, increased nearly 15 percent. 95
The seriatim criminal trials of Mikhail Khodorkovskiy present
the dualist state at its apogee. Richard Sakwa, one of the UK's
leading Russia experts, concluded "the judicial system manifestly
engaged in a political trial" that "not only damaged state
development but also strengthened the arbitrariness of the
administrative regime."96

The state's peculiar theory of embezzlement-the recurrent
criminal charge against the top two leaders of the political
opposition in the last twenty years-was the subject, inter alia, of
analysis by independent experts convened by the Presidential
Council of the Russian Federation for Civil Society and Human
Rights, which submitted a report on December 21, 2011.97 (Full
disclosure: the author was one of the independent experts.) These
reports, along with the Presidential Council's own observations and
recommendations, were personally delivered to President Medvedev
by Mikhail Fedotov, Chairman of the Council, on December 27,
2011.98 As summarized by the StrasbourgCourt:
94. Compare Navalnyy and Ofitserov v. Russia, Nos. 46632/13 & 28671/14, July 4, 2016,
at ¶¶ 61-65 and Statement of Facts, Navalnyy and Ofitserov v. Russia, No. 78193/17,
communicated on Dec. 21, 2017, with Statement of Facts, Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v.
Russia, Nos. 51111/07 and 42757/07, communicated Mar. 24, 2014, ¶¶ 210-12.
95. JORDAN GANS-MORSE, PROPERTY RIGHTS IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA: VIOLENCE,
CORRUPTION, AND THE DEMAND FOR LAW 88-89 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2017).
96. RICHARD SAKWA, PUTIN AND THE OLIGARCH: THE KHODORKOVSKY - YUKOS AFFAIR

51 (Tauris, 2014).
97. REPORT PREPARED FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
FOR CIVIL SOCIETY AND HUMAN RIGHTS REGARDING THE VERDICT OF THE KHAMOVNICHESKY
DISTRICT COURT OF THE CITY OF MOSCOW AGAINST M.B. KHODORKOVSKIY AND P.L. LEBEDEV,

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 1-23/10 (Dec. 27, 2010). A Russian translation of this report is available
at: http://www.president-sovet.ru/documents/read/58/. It is available in English in Vol. 4, No.
3 JOURNAL OF EURASIAN LAW (2011).
98. Pa60an Bcmpeua C Coeemuucom Hpeaudeuma, Hpedcedamenem Coeema Ho
Paaeumuio Ipadcdaucicoeo 06igecmea H Hpaeanr U7Io6eca Muxaunom WPedomObIf
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The report contained contributions from a group of Russian,
European and American experts and scholars. None of the
expert group found any support for the allegations of
embezzlement or money laundering. Having considered the
expert reports, the Presidential Council for Civil Society and
Human Rights issued a series of recommendations in which,
amongst other things, it called for the judgment to be
repealed and describing the second case as 'a miscarriage of
justice': in particular, the report held that the applicants
were convicted for acts that were not directly prescribed by
the criminal law and did not contain features of a corpus
delicti, as well as without due process. 99
The application of Article 160 in Khodorkovskiy's and Lebedev's
case was found to be at variance with traditional elements of
embezzlement in Russian law and was inconsistent with the
Russian Supreme Court's interpretation of relevant provisions of
the Criminal Code. It is revealing that this strained theory was
preferred to more straightforward theories of culpability available
under other provisions of the Criminal Code but eschewed in the
Russian state's prosecution of Khodorkovskiy.
Following the applicants' success in Navalnyy & Ofitserov v.
Russia (No. 1), Navalnyy requested that the criminal proceedings
against him be reopened and terminated.100 Strasbourg had found
that the Russian courts had applied the criminal law (regarding
embezzlement) arbitrarily against him and concluded that, in
principle, such a reopening of the proceedings would be appropriate

redress. 101 The Russian district court nevertheless found the
applicants guilty of the same embezzlement offenses, a judgment

[Working Meeting with PresidentialAdvisor, Chairmanof the Council for the Development of
Civil Society and Human Rights, MikhailFedotov], MMHHHCTPAIHH: FPE3H4EHTA POCCIrn
[ADMINISTRATION: PRESIDENT OF RUSSIA], (Dec. 27 2011), http://kremlin.ru/events/president/

news/14153.
99. Khodorkovskiy & Lebedev v. Russia, Nos. 11082/06 & 13772/05, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶
362 (2013). See also Khodorkovskiy & Lebedev v. Russia (No. 2), No. 5111/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶
364 (2020). Following Putin's third inauguration, several experts as well as the head of the
Council's working group responsible for their organization, retired Constitutional Court
Justice Tamara Morshchakova, were subject to criminal investigation including searches of
homes and offices, seizure of property, and interrogation. See, e.g., Jeffrey Kahn, In Putin's
Russia, Shooting the Messenger, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2013; Jeffrey Kahn, The Richelieu Effect:
The Khodorkovsky Case and Political Interference with Justice, in A SOCIOLOGY OF JUSTICE
IN RUSSIA, supra note 89, at 231-58. The investigation was ultimately closed for lack of a
corpus delicti. One Russian expert, Sergei Guriev, entered self-imposed exile. See Sergei
Guriev, Why IAm Not Returning to Russia, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2013. The Council of Europe's
Commissioner for Human Rights criticized this pressure against the experts. See Report by
Nils Muiinieks, CommDH (2013) 21, ¶ 178 (Nov. 12, 2013).
100. Statement of Facts, Navalnyy & Ofitserov v. Russia (No. 2), No. 78193/17, Eur. Ct.
H.R. 3 (2017).
101. Navalnyy & Ofitserov v. Russia (No. 1), supra note 82, ¶ 136.

2021-2022]

ANTI-DEFERENCE DEVICE

141

&

upheld by the regional court. The applicants were again fined and
given suspended prison sentences, effectively excluding them from
seeking elected office as a result.
Unsurprisingly, the case is back in Strasbourg. In Navalnyy
Ofitserov (No. 1), the Court dismissed ratione materiae the alleged
violation of Article 18 taken in conjunction with Articles 6 and 7 of
the Convention because the relevant provisions of those articles "do
not contain any express or implied restrictions that may form the
subject of the Court's examination under Article 18 of the
Convention." 102 The Court might be reconsidering that view of
Article 18's application, an important and welcome change.10 3
Regardless of that outcome, the Court should adopt a greater
willingness to see links between Navalnyy's many cases, a context
that is itself evidence of a lack of good faith in the application of
restrictions on rights protected by the Convention. In the years
between Navalnyy & Ofitserov (No. 1) and Navalnyy & Ofitserov
(No. 2), the European Court has found violations of Navalnyy's

rights three times.1 0 4 In two of these, violations of Article 18 were
found. In those cases, concerning serial arrests, the Court did apply
a contextual analysis of the accumulating effect of these seriatim
detentions. The Grand Chamber observed: "Against this
background, the applicant's claim that his exercise of freedom of
assembly has become a particular object for targeted suppression
appears coherent within the broader context of the Russian
authorities' attempts at the material time to bring the opposition's
political activity under control."1 0 5

And in the most recent judgment, concerning Navalnyy's pretrial house arrest, the Court's Third Section noted its previous
reliance: "On the converging contextual evidence that at the
material time the authorities were becoming increasingly severe in
their response to the conduct of the applicant and other political
activists and, more generally, to their approach to public assemblies
of a political nature ."106

There is no logical reason why that contextual recognition
cannot transcend an applicant's cases or even the cases of different
but similarly situated applicants. As noted above, the Court may
have taken its first steps toward this approach. This article argues
that there are good historical reasons to understand that doing so
102. Id. at ¶ 129.
103. See EHRAC & Jeffrey Kahn, supra note 53.
104. Navalnyy v. Russia, No. 32963/16, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2018); Navalnyy v. Russia, Nos.
29580/12 and four others, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2018); Navalnyy v. Russia (No. 2), No. 43734/14, Eur.
Ct. H.R. (2019).
105. Navalnyy v. Russia, Nos. 29580/12 and four others, supra note 104, ¶ 173.
106. Navalnyy v. Russia (No. 2), No. 43734/14, ¶ 96.
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even more boldly if not with alacrity given the somber truth such
findings reveal-achieves precisely the objective that Article 18 was
intended to secure: a warning to and about member States
backsliding in their commitments to protect human rights.
VI. A CAUTIONARY NOTE IN CONCLUSION

The European Convention emerged at a time of great pain after
global war, mass suffering, and totalitarianism. Its drafters hoped
to prevent the recurrence of what they had lived through.
Committing their states to respect human rights was insufficient;
an enforcement mechanism was needed, as were devices to test the
legitimacy of assertions that rights required restriction in the
interests of a democratic, rule-of-law society. Article 18 was one
such device, embedded in an international treaty between sovereign
states. That treaty assumes the good faith of those who have
undertaken legal obligations through its ratification. The conclusion
that a state has violated Article 18 essentially rejects that
assumption in the adjudged case.
There are grave risks to lowering the evidentiary standard or
shifting burdens of proof in Article 18 cases. Likewise, diminishing
the deference accorded to states as similar violations accumulate
may lead a State to refuse to countenance such treatment. In such
a circumstance,

States

may

consider

renouncing

its

treaty

obligations rather than continuing to tolerate the "slur on their
honor" by such persistent doubts about its good faith.10 7
Loss of a member State would be a terrible price to pay for that
State's citizens as well as the Council of Europe. But the alternative
is not costless. Article 18 violations are a bellwether of a State's
regression into authoritarianism. Put another way, it is a sign that
the State is abandoning the fundamental principles on which both
the Convention system, and the Council of Europe, are based.
Continuing to afford a backsliding Member State the presumption
of good faith when its restrictions on rights are pretextual ones is
inconsistent with the object and purpose of Article 18 as understood
from the travaux pr6paratoires. Worse, a disinclination to hold such
a state to account sends a signal to would-be autocrats in other
member States to demand a margin of appreciation for practices
that are nothing more than ruses covering repression.
The work of the European Court of Human Rights is not easy.
Its position as an arbiter of human rights obligations with which
States, perhaps surprisingly, have agreed to burden themselves is a

107. Virally, supra note 12.
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precarious one. Assessing the proper balance in interpreting the

Convention in light of the many different circumstances in member
States may sometimes present issues with institutional risks clad
in sheep's clothing. But this wolf comes as a wolf: pretending a state
deserves an assumption of good faith when it does not presents a
serious danger to the integrity of this extraordinary international
system for the protection of human rights.
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